53 posts tagged with “product management”

In Jason Lemkin’s account of SaaStr’s break with Adobe Marketo, the formal cancellation is almost beside the point. SaaStr had already moved most of Marketo’s work elsewhere:

And once you do that once, you start asking the obvious question. We’ve now migrated almost all of Marketo’s functionality onto Salesforce. Not because Salesforce has better features. Because Salesforce has an API our agents can actually use. One day you look up and realize you’re paying $60K a year for a product you’ve already routed around.

That is the new B2B churn motion. It isn’t a feature bake-off. It’s an agent-operability test, and legacy vendors are failing it quietly, one migrated workflow at a time, before they ever show up on the churn report.

I do think this is where a lot of software, especially B2B software is headed. Even in my own day-to-day, I’m loathe to use tools that don’t allow me to connect to one of my AI agents. Zoom out to an enterprise context and now agent operability becomes a product-quality problem that can eventually lead to churn.

Lemkin’s advice:

If you build or run a B2B company, the Marketo story is a checklist of what not to become.

Make your product operable by an agent, now. Not next year. The question is no longer “is our UI good.” It’s “can a customer’s agent do real work against our API without a human babysitting it.” If the answer is no, you are already on a churn clock you can’t see. Webhooks, an SDK, an MCP server, clean auth, real history. This is table stakes in 2026.

Experience is usually treated as an advantage, as exemplified by Google product leader Jules Walter defining what product sense is in Lenny’s Newsletter:

Product sense is the skill of consistently being able to craft products (or make changes to existing products) that have the intended impact on their users. Product sense relies on (1) empathy to discover meaningful user needs and (2) creativity to come up with solutions that effectively address those needs.

Quoting Walter, Tanner Kohler, a researcher at Nielsen Norman Group, argues that it can become a trap when the current problem only looks familiar. He contrasts his definition of product sense with Walter’s:

Product sense is the ability to recognize when current problems match past successes or failures and reliably estimate how similar solutions will affect the desired outcomes.

[…]

This definition improves on Walter’s because it turns product sense from a loose combination of empathy and creativity into a measurable decision-making skill. It specifies the mechanism behind strong product judgment: recognizing when a current problem resembles past successes or failures, predicting likely outcomes, and knowing when those comparisons are reliable. That makes product sense easier to recognize, practice, and improve.

Pattern recognition gets most of the credit when we talk about senior judgment. For designers, calibration means knowing when a pattern that worked before no longer fits the problem in front of you.

Kohler then limits where experience can be trusted:

Our definition requires people with strong product sense to know both when an experience-based pattern is likely to work and when it is not. That judgment is the “sense.” It is not magical, does not come automatically with time, and remains limited to a person’s domain of expertise.

Consider a fire chief experienced with small building fires advising a crew during a skyscraper fire, a NICU nurse caring for an adult patient, or a chess grandmaster playing checkers. Do the cues they learned in one domain still apply?

Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein point out that any new decision-making environment needs to provide sufficient familiar clues for an expert to accurately match the patterns they’ve learned to the current situation.

Kohler warns that AI can also interrupt the decision–implementation–measurement–reflection loop that creates those patterns:

Buzzwords come and go. There’s nothing wrong with the term “product sense.” The problem is believing that, with little data, an ever increasing velocity, and more work and decision making outsourced to AI, people can develop a “sense” for what to do without rigorous thinking.

Intuition comes with time and repeated exposure to real product decisions and results. AI may rob you of the chance to develop product sense if you aren’t careful. Stay in the ring, own your decisions, and face the results. This is what will make you valuable for years to come.

Most software companies organize product work around squads. Users don’t care. Their workflows cut across the boundaries we draw between teams, so a local decision about a table, filter, or bulk action can become a product-wide inconsistency.

In my conversation with Denis Cristea on UX Spotlight by Userlytics, I described how this happens:

We have this notion in modern software companies around squads and how a squad will own a particular surface area in a product. You’ve got your product manager, product designer, engineering lead, and then a bunch of engineers. So that’s your classic triad and team makeup. Theoretically everyone owns their roadmaps, talks to customers, and decides what to build.

Users don’t just work in one module. Users often work in multiple modules. So they’re already crossing the org chart, if you will. […] When thinking about the entire user experience, you already have to coordinate across different teams.

Meanwhile, you’ve got another module, another group, another team who wants to work on something similar, but they’re not talking to each other. When that happens, that’s when you get the inconsistent user experience. They might solve the same interaction differently.

A design system standardizes the components each squad uses. Weekly critique lets designers see the decisions being made across those squads before separate implementations harden.

I used the example of bulk actions at BuildOps:

The other thing that we’ve been doing a lot on my team at BuildOps, the design team, is the weekly design crit. That’s a way for us to keep the connective tissue together and ensure that the experience across the different modules stays as consistent as we can.

Going back to the bulk actions example, if one team needs it and a designer builds that experience, other designers will see it and say, “Okay, that will actually help my area too. After you design it and create the components, let me take that and put it in my area too, and argue with my product manager to prioritize that work.”

Critique coordinates the product while the squads remain autonomous. It gives teams a shared view of unfinished decisions and a place to resolve them before users have to deal with the seams.

Product managers can use the same ritual:

I would recommend that product managers think about implementing something that designers do, which is critiques. I don’t think product managers have this ritual of sharing what they’re working on and how they’re thinking through problems.

When you build a culture of sharing and oversharing, and also wanting to make everyone else’s work better by giving them good constructive feedback, that’s when the whole product is going to get lifted up.

Quotes lightly edited for clarity.

Pick one metric on your team’s dashboard. What decision would change if it moved?

Ant Murphy offers two questions for finding out:

Two of my favourite questions to ask about any product metric are:

1. What are you trying to learn?

2. What change will you make as a result?

There are thousands of things you can measure, but measuring for measurement’s sake isn’t helpful. It needs to drive decisions.

The second question puts a team on the hook before the data arrives. It forces the decision rule into the open, when there’s less temptation to rationalize whatever the chart happens to show.

Murphy also argues that difficulty assembling a metric can be evidence that the team has stopped settling for whatever its analytics tool already exposes:

And that’s the trap that Ridgway was describing all those years ago and it’s still relevant today.

So I see friction as a good sign - it means the metric is:

• Unique: specific to your product and your problem, not pulled off the analytics shelf
• Meaningful: tied to the behaviour change you actually care about
• And thought through: you’ve actually unpacked what you’re trying to learn

So it’s worth pushing through the friction. I’ll take a meaningful proxy, or a smaller sample of something high-quality, over a generic metric every time.

Lola Famulegun, writing for Nielsen Norman Group, separates the UX metrics that describe design performance from the business metrics executives use to judge an investment:

Upstream metrics tell you how the design performed. Examples include task success rates, error rates, SUS scores.

Downstream metrics capture what changed in the business as a result. Examples include support contact volume, conversion rates, and churn.

Downstream metrics tell you what the work was worth. You don’t need to abandon the metrics you already collect, but you do need to build a bridge from them to the ones leadership tracks. The table below maps common upstream metrics to the business priorities they most directly connect to, with a suggested framing for each.

Famulegun also points out that the translation depends on access to data outside the UX team. I recall that my team had to fight with my company’s revenue operations team to get access to Salesforce data so we could make prioritization decisions with ARR as an input.

Famulegun:

The data you need already exists inside your organization. Partner with finance, product analytics, customer support, or marketing to understand what they track and to get access to before-and-after data for flows you’ve redesigned. Even directional data is persuasive when it’s honest: “Contacts about [feature] dropped 30% in the quarter following the navigation change.”

A practical note: this translation only works if you have access to downstream data. If your team isn’t currently connected to product analytics, customer support, or finance reporting, that’s the first conversation to have.

The goal isn’t to overstate what UX delivers. It’s to surface the connection that already exists between the work your team does and the numbers the business is tracking.

Karo Zieminski and Dheeraj Sharma recommend starting with a critic: one recurring job, one explicit standard, and a loop that stops before autonomy outruns our ability to inspect it. Their example reviews PRDs, but the pattern fits any creative work whose quality we can describe clearly enough to test. Sharma grounds that advice in the 30-plus agents he has built for his content operation:

I have built 30+ agents that now keep a real content operation running across my newsletter and YouTube channels. You’d be surprised how modest the useful ones look. If you start with an agent that “runs your whole business”, you’ll most likely build something fragile. OpenAI’s advice is to maximize a single agent’s capabilities first before even thinking about multiple agents. Anthropic’s rule is even stricter: add complexity only when it demonstrably improves outcomes. One agent, one job, one loop.

The rubric is the consequential design artifact. It turns tacit judgment into criteria the agent can apply consistently and the human can challenge. The retry limit matters for the same reason: repeated failure becomes evidence that the product thinking needs work, rather than an invitation to let the loop run forever.

A real critic checks whether the doc can do its job after engineering pokes holes in it. It needs to be forced to review every PRD through the same fixed format (every single time), and come back with a score, a diagnosis, and a concrete fix list. It also needs a retry limit. For PRDs, 2–3 rounds is usually enough. If it still fails after 3 loops, revisit the product thinking. And keep notes about every failure. Anthropic’s evals guidance treats every bug as a test case. The PRD your critic scored wrong last week is the exact document you re-test it against after every change.

For designers, this is a practical way to keep judgment inside the system. The agent can expose weak reasoning and carry the review process forward; deciding what deserves to ship remains a human responsibility.

I always come back to the same rule: agentize the tasks, not the craft.

Use your agents to move the PRDs to GitHub, but review them first.

Keep human decision gates at the moments where judgement matters.

Keep using the parts of your brain that make the work yours. Keep the joy you find in creating it.

Marina Krutchinsky, the writer behind UX Mentor Diaries, spots the part designers tend to miss: they have internalized the belief that design work is secondary unless someone else translates it into business language.

Here’s the thing: most executives don’t understand what design is.

To them, designers are the people who make things pretty after the real decisions get made.

And every time you present your work in design language, you confirm that belief.

Her client had just shipped a checkout redesign that cut abandonment by 35%. Real work, invisible to the CFO who walked past her in the hallway. Three slides changed the conversation:

“Our checkout flow was losing $1.2M annually in abandoned carts.”

“We identified 3 friction points and redesigned the payment experience.”

“We recovered $840K in the first two quarters. Projected $1.4M annually.”

That’s it. 3 slides. Maybe 45 seconds of talking.

The CFO asked her to stay after the meeting. First real conversation they’d ever had.

Krutchinsky’s three-part structure is familiar: name the leak, name the intervention, name the result. The sharper move is the business-language translation that follows:

CFOs don’t care about usability scores. They care about margin, revenue, and risk.

When you connect your work to those things, you stop being “the design person” and start being someone who solves expensive problems.

That imbalance will not fix itself. Designers already know the first language: usability, friction, flows, trust. The second one is finance’s language: margin, revenue, risk, and the expensive problems design actually solves.

In June 2026, Stack Overflow unveiled a full rebrand by studio Koto, repositioning from Q&A platform to “the world’s most vital source for technologists” right as monthly new questions on the site are down roughly 77% since ChatGPT launched. The brand investment and the traffic freefall are happening simultaneously. That is the context for Ishan Gupta, a software engineer at Amazon, and his five-phase history of how the old engineering workflow collapsed.

Software engineering was a craft you absorbed slowly, then practiced in a long, predictable sequence: Dive deep on the technology, write the code, ask Stack Overflow when stuck, escalate to a senior engineer when Stack Overflow failed, ship the ticket. The product manager owned the funnel. The engineer owned the build. Both sides treated this division as physics.

That division is dissolving. Gupta traces it through the IDE-native era (e.g., GitHub Copilot and Cursor), the spec-driven era, and the Claude Code Routines era (Anthropic’s scheduled, persistent agents). At each step, another piece of work that used to require a human gets handed off. Gupta’s diagnosis:

Anthropic recently told its growth team to hire more product managers, not fewer. The reason, as reported in industry coverage, was that Claude Code had quietly turned its engineering org into a team that ships at roughly three times its actual headcount, and the bottleneck moved from the integrated development environment (IDE) to the people deciding what to build.

That detail is easy to miss in the noise of every AI productivity claim. It is also the structural shift the rest of the industry is now living through. The bottleneck in software is no longer typing. It is deciding what to type. And the engineers who treat that as someone else’s problem are about to plateau.

That same shift is what Koto’s rebrand is responding to. Cat Hill, senior strategist at Koto, put the rebrand angle plainly: “In the AI era, everyone wants faster answers. But speed is useful only if the knowledge underneath is trusted.” For designers, that is the opening: the product-thinking gap is no longer a soft skill around the edge of engineering work. It is where the work is moving.

Gupta’s clearest description of the new engineering identity is also the case for why product judgment matters more:

The 2026 version of a great engineer is not the one who writes the most code. It is the one who knows what to build, can prove it is worth building, and has the agent fleet plus the review discipline to ship it without the system collapsing under its own velocity.

Karo Zieminski, in her newsletter Product with Attitude, is writing for builders, founders, and PMs, but the design translation is straightforward: AI fluency without critique is just a faster way to lose your ability to evaluate the output for yourself.

She draws the distinction:

Plain AI literacy means knowing how to use AI tools. It means learning to prompt, create automations, and bring AI into your workflows.

Critical AI literacy goes further. It adds systems awareness: understanding that AI is not just a tool on your screen, but part of a larger system of model choices, product decisions, business incentives, policy constraints, ethical tradeoffs, and human consequences.

Attitude is the posture that turns AI literacy into critical AI literacy.

That word, posture, matters. It is the same split in not outsourcing the learning: the tool doesn’t determine whether you get sharper or softer; the way you use it does.

Zieminski puts research behind that concern:

The data is on the table now. Microsoft Research surveyed 319 knowledge workers in 2025 and found that higher confidence in the AI is associated with less critical thinking, while higher confidence in yourself is associated with more. MIT Media Lab’s “Your Brain on ChatGPT” study measured the same erosion at the level of brain activity. The muscle is real, and it atrophies on schedule.

For designers, the warning is: don’t let the tool do so much of the looking, choosing, and checking that you stop building those muscles yourself.

Zieminski defines the working posture plainly:

AI with attitude means using AI with judgment, boundaries, curiosity, and scrutiny. You enjoy powerful tools without worshipping them, panicking about them, or letting them decide how you think, work, create, and learn.

Tony Le separates a usability problem from a clarity problem before the team starts redesigning screens:

A usability problem is when the user understands the promise but struggles to complete a task.

A clarity problem is when the user never forms a confident mental model in the first place.

They hesitate. They guess. They bounce. Not because the UI is hard, but because the product is not making a clear argument.

Le’s example shows the distinction in practice:

A few years back, I worked with a company building an internal SaaS product, something they planned to launch within about a year.

They did a lot of things right early on. They invested in research. They poured real money into development, easily in the five-figure range. The team was shipping.

Then onboarding came up.

The owner tried to use the product and got stuck.

Instead of treating that moment like a signal to test the build, align on how the system worked, and validate the onboarding path, the conclusion was immediate.

This is a UX and UI problem.

So the team did what teams often do under pressure. They rebuilt.

They revamped the system once.

Then they revamped it again.

And after all that effort, the real issue came into focus. The UI was not broken. The product lacked a shared, plain language model of how it worked. Key concepts were obvious to the people building it, but not obvious to the person trying to onboard into it. So when onboarding started, confusion showed up as hesitation and wrong clicks, and the team assumed the interface was the culprit. They revamped the system twice, only to learn the real fix was clarity, clearer concepts, clearer naming, and a clearer first win.

That is the part teams miss. The stuck user is real, so the design critique feels real too. But if the product has not made a clear argument, every screen-level fix is downstream of the wrong problem.

I see this most often in products that have accumulated internal language. The team knows what a feature is for because they have lived with the roadmap, the sales narrative, the customer calls, and the implementation details. A new user gets none of that. They get a label, a blank state, a primary button, and maybe a tour.

So clarity is not just better copy. It is the product choosing what it is asking the user to understand first. The interface can make that choice visible, but it cannot make the choice for you.

The line usually attributed to Einstein goes like this: “If I had an hour to solve a problem, I’d spend 55 minutes thinking about the problem and 5 minutes thinking about solutions.” It is a warning against racing to the answer. Gale Robins, writing for UX Collective, makes the same case for product teams—then moves it one step earlier than Einstein did.

Her subject is the decision that rarely gets scheduled: whether a customer signal deserves discovery at all. She calls it Signal Evaluation, and she describes it bluntly:

Signal Evaluation is not a box to tick on the way to the real work. It is a filter, and a good filter is defined by what it keeps out. If most of what reaches your team makes it into discovery, the filter is not working; it is just a turnstile.

This is Einstein’s 55 minutes, relocated:

It is tempting to think discovery begins when you start talking to customers. It begins one step earlier, with the call to research this rather than something else. Every signal that reaches a team […] arrives carrying an implicit claim: this is worth your attention. Evaluating a signal is the act of testing that claim before you spend anything on it.

The difference she leans on is between a feature signal and a job signal:

The distinction that matters is whether the signal is about the customer’s job or about your product […]. “The export button is confusing” is a feature signal: it concerns your solution and usually warrants a quick fix rather than a discovery effort. “I cannot get my insights to my stakeholders” is a job signal: it is about what the customer is trying to accomplish, and it may hide an underserved need worth real investigation.

That is the trap Einstein was guarding against. The seductive request arrives pre-packaged as its own solution—add the widget, fix the button—and it is tempting precisely because it lets you skip the 55 minutes. Robins’s point is that a signal can be strong, genuine, and still aimed at the wrong job.

Here is where she goes past Einstein. His hour is already committed: he has a problem and is deciding how to spend time inside it. Robins is working a layer earlier. Her question is whether the signal has earned the hour in the first place. In her words, the skipped judgment is “whether to begin it at all.” Signal Evaluation is the gate before Einstein’s clock even starts.

AI is what makes that gate matter more now, not less.

AI can scan your entire feedback corpus, cluster signals by frequency, surface correlations with churn, and tell you in minutes that the widget request appeared in twenty-three of forty calls. That is genuinely useful and genuinely predictive: pattern-finding at a scale no human can match.

But notice what AI cannot do in that example. It can tell you the signal is strong. It cannot tell you the signal is pointing at the wrong job. That judgment, that “more widgets” is really “I cannot see what matters,” and that building the literal request might make things worse, is meaning-making, not pattern-matching.

Last week I linked Ravi Mehta on the three layers of context engineering for AI prototyping: functional spec, visual wireframe, structured data. Karo Zieminski, an AI PM writing Product with Attitude, makes the same case at the product scale and cites Mehta directly. Mehta wrote about prototyping one screen; Zieminski writes about designing the whole product around an agent.

Zieminski puts it in one line:

Prompt engineering is deciding what and how to ask the model. Context engineering is deciding what the model knows when it answers.

Then the asymmetry:

A well-crafted prompt in a poorly engineered context still fails. A poorly crafted prompt in a well-engineered context often succeeds.

That asymmetry is the argument for treating context as the underlying system.

If that asymmetry is real—and a year of using these tools tells me it is—then most teams are still optimizing the wrong layer. The visible artifact is the prompt. The work that actually decides the output is everything around it.

The piece I want to underline is who owns the work:

PMs define what goes in each context layer. Engineers build the infrastructure to fetch and store it… If the PM isn’t doing this, one of two things happens. Either an engineer makes the product decision by default, or nobody makes it and the agent gets every available signal dumped into the window.

Zieminski calls the alternative abdication. I think she’s right and I also think most PM job descriptions in 2026 haven’t caught up. The hiring filter still selects for ticket-shaping and roadmap maintenance, not for “decide what the model should know about the user, what should age out, what should never get re-fetched.” Those are product decisions about how memory is organized, and the people best positioned to make them—PMs who understand the product and the user—are often the ones least equipped to talk about retrieval and eviction. The gap is one of vocabulary and authority.

Both write for PMs, but the work is also design work. The context an agent sees is a designed surface: what gets included, what gets hidden, what should age out, what should persist between sessions. Mehta’s three-layer brief—spec, wireframe, JSON, twenty minutes in Figma, real data—is daily prototyping for designers working with agents now. Zieminski’s architecture is the system those prototypes live inside. If designers don’t show up here, PMs and engineers will design this surface for us.

Nearly nine in ten organizations now use AI in at least one business function. Ninety-four percent aren’t seeing significant value from it. Gale Robins, writing for UX Collective, argues that the gap is a framing problem, not an adoption problem. Her earlier piece on discovery judgment made the same case; the new one sharpens it with an anecdote that shows the trap:

A team I spoke with recently had compressed their discovery cycle from six weeks to ten days using AI. They were proud, and the throughput was real. When I asked what the work had taught them that they did not already believe, the answer was: not much. Same questions, faster. Same answers, sooner.

Same questions, faster. Same answers, sooner. Her analogy for the wider pattern is the electric factory one I’ve used before:

When factories first installed electricity, productivity barely moved. Manufacturers replaced steam engines with electric motors and kept the line-shaft layout. The breakthrough came later, when they redesigned the factory around what electricity made possible. The technology was only part of the answer.

Robins maps McKinsey’s three waves of AI value—productivity, differentiation, transaction-cost reduction—and finds most teams stuck in the first one. Robins on where they have to go to get out:

These decisions are upstream of every artifact a team produces. They are also where AI productivity gains help least, and where human judgment compounds the most.

Robins’s evidence undersells her own thesis. She leans on Generative AI at Work—the Stanford-and-MIT customer-support study by economists Erik Brynjolfsson, Danielle Li, and Lindsey Raymond that became the canonical citation for “AI helps novices most”—to argue AI raises the floor, not the ceiling. Novices gained 34%; experienced workers, basically zero. That’s why so many designers who have never coded—like me—are now suddenly shipping with this newfound superpower. It’s the same finding behind the junior designer crisis. But LinkedIn’s Full Stack Builder rollout found the opposite: top performers adopted AI fastest and got the most out of it, because they had the judgment to know what to ask for. The floor-not-ceiling story is only true where the questions are fixed. Once the questions are the work, the pattern inverts. That’s exactly the territory Robins is mapping. If AI rewards the experienced most when the work is judgment-shaped, framing is where the gap between teams widens.

Marcus Moretti’s guide to agent-native product management, in Every, is the orchestration shift showing up on the PM side of the team. The guide opens with the 1930s Procter & Gamble origin story: someone owns the product. The job has been rewritten so many times since then that PMs are now expected to be design partners, diplomats, sales people, and statisticians on top of running the 100+ software subscriptions the average company buys. What’s interesting is that the piece is describing the old role, finally legible again now that agents can absorb the administrative debt that piled up on top of it.

Now, much of the interdisciplinary work that goes into product management can be done by an LLM in minutes, sometimes seconds. What used to be a three-hour-long analytics investigation is now a simple back-and-forth with Claude. A product review that used to be a fortnightly chore emerges from a single typo-ridden chat message. This has been my recent experience, at least. I no longer struggle with semicolons in SQL queries or even write tickets. All of my product management work happens in conversation with, in my case, Claude Code. The conversation is the work.

“The conversation is the work” sounds like a description of the new job. Read it next to the 1930s origin story and it’s a description of the old one. The Brand Man at P&G wasn’t writing SQL; he was deciding what the product should be and who it was for. The intervening ninety years of accumulated tooling—agile ceremonies and ticket hygiene, analytics dashboards on top of those—was friction PMs had to push through to get back to the actual work. Moretti’s /ce-strategy command, modeled on Richard Rumelt’s Good Strategy Bad Strategy, isn’t a new artifact either. Strategy documents predate LLMs by decades. What’s new, Moretti says, is the cadence: every few months, the agent re-runs the strategy interview with the accumulated context of everything you’ve shipped.

Writing a strategy document cold is hard. The best way to do it, I’ve found, is to have an agent interview you. The ce-strategy skill does this. It runs through the sections in order and has built-in guidance about what makes a good answer (and what kinds of answers to push back on). […] The interview is deliberately conversational. If the first answer to, “What’s the core problem this product solves” is vague, the agent drills down: “Whose situation specifically? What do they try today, and why doesn’t it work?” The guidance here is taken from personal experience and from the Rumelt book.

The guide assumes a PM who has the taste to recognize when the agent’s follow-up has exposed a gap. The ones who don’t will end up with a strategy.md full of confident-sounding nonsense, generated quickly and reviewed lightly. Agent-native PM removes the alibi that you were too busy with tickets to do the actual thinking. That maps to a warning from Raj Nandan Sharma: when generation gets cheap, the scarce skill is refusal: knowing what to throw out and why. Moretti’s PM is doing exactly that, sentence by sentence, in the strategy interview.

Moretti closes:

LLMs have allowed our tools to catch up with the multifaceted duties of product managers. For me, product management has been reduced to the interesting parts: dreaming up features, thinking through designs, looking at interesting data, and talking to users. We all feel the economic imperative to embrace AI tools, but the better reason, I think, is to make work more fun.

Cat Wu, Anthropic’s Head of Product for Claude Code, describes the hiring filter on her team in her interview with Lenny Rachitsky:

I think all of the roles are merging. PMs are doing some engineering work. Engineers are doing PM work. Designers are PMing and also landing code. You can either hire a lot more engineers who have great product taste, or you can keep your engineering hiring the same and hire a lot more PMs to help guide some of their work. On our team, we’re pretty focused on hiring engineers with great product taste. This way we can reduce the amount of overhead for shipping any product. Like there are many engineers on our team who are fully able to end to end go from see user feedback on Twitter through to like ship a product at the end of the week with almost no product involvement. And this, I think, is actually like the most efficient way to ship something. So I think like engineer and PM are kind of overlapping and you will get a lot of benefit from having more of either. I think product taste is still a very rare skill to have and we’ll pretty much hire anyone who we feel has demonstrated this strongly.

This is what the Full Stack Builder pattern looks like as a hiring filter. The headline is the merging of roles. Wu’s own background says where the bench comes from:

Yeah, I was an engineer for many years. I was then a VC very briefly before joining Anthropic. And actually almost all the PMs on our team have either been engineers or ship code here on Claude Code. And so that’s one of the things that I think helps build trust with the team and also just enables us to move a lot faster. And then actually our designers also have been front-end engineers before.

So to be clear, Wu doesn’t say that the roles have merged, but what she’s describing is the continued blurring of lines.

Ant Murphy opens with an eyebrow-raising McKinsey number:

McKinsey reports that 88% of organisations say they “use AI” but only about 1% have mature AI deployments delivering real value.

Murphy’s explanation for the gap is familiar: the diffusion of innovation, Geoffrey Moore’s chasm between early adopters and the majority, now applied to AI. What’s less common in the AI discourse is a behavioral explanation for why the adoption keeps stalling. Murphy:

AI is personal. It’s not another tool, to some it’s viewed as a replacement. “AI attacks our identity in a way that most software doesn’t” — Vikram Sreekanti

That resistance shows up in the record: a friend’s “I didn’t sign up for this”. Claire Vo described designers as the most resistant to change in the EPD triad, vocal AI opponents with little appetite for campaigning for resources. None of it is irrational. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that humans weigh losses about twice as heavily as equivalent gains. Years of accumulated craft become our identity. AI doesn’t ask you to learn new tools; it asks you to renegotiate what made you worth hiring in the first place. The reskilling conversation treats that as a capability problem. Identity problems don’t resolve themselves through training on new tools.

Murphy on what that requires:

Surviving a paradigm shift like this is less about what your product does […] Instead it’s about you adapting to the change.

The 88% are held back by what AI is asking them to let go of. Murphy’s argument is that organizations clearing the chasm are doing the internal work first—on process, on how teams function—before it shows up in the product.

There’s an old relationship adage that you can’t be a good partner to someone until you’ve worked out your own stuff first. I think Murphy’s argument is the organizational equivalent.

I’ve been pro-prototype: PMs replacing PRDs, designers prototyping interactions in code. Pavel Samsonov, writing at Product Picnic, aims at exactly that position. He opens by borrowing a distinction from Andy Polaine:

Demos and prototypes sit on a continuum, but I consider demos something to help you show a concept to other people in a form that looks and feels like the real thing. Prototypes are things you create to test something you don’t know until you build and test it.

Correct distinction. A demo succeeds on stakeholder approval; a prototype succeeds on learning. Both artifacts can be interactive and polished. What separates them is what counts as success. Samsonov on what happens when teams conflate them:

The only thing these demos are helping you test is whether your stakeholder likes what they see (the first loop) and as soon as they say “yes,” it becomes good enough to ship. Whether that second loop (releases go out, measurements come in) ever gets tracked or not is not something I’d be willing to put money on. Because once the demo is productionized, it goes from the realm of delivery velocity (which gets you shoutouts and promotions) into the realm of maintenance (which tends to be ignored even as it eats up more than half of the team’s bandwidth).

AI makes it easier to produce both, and Samsonov’s read on what happens when teams use the speedup wrong:

Shoving out more prototypes is not a heuristic for success; it is a heuristic for failure because it shows that you don’t know what you are trying to learn.

Agreed. Samsonov goes further:

This is exactly why AI-generated prototypes are not working, and have not helped anyone do anything ever. Some have accused me of going too far with this assertion, but I stand by it, because it is rooted in the very nature of what a prototype is (and is not), and what makes it successful (or does not).

Here’s where I differ. Brian Lovin’s Notion prototype playground exists because static mocks enforce golden-path thinking. The playground surfaces the messy middle of AI chat: follow-ups and latency changes no one mocks up. Édouard Wautier’s Dust team prototypes state changes and motion Figma can’t show. Figma PMs ran five user interviews in two days off an AI-built prototype, which is a textbook closed second loop. All three count as prototype work.

Samsonov’s diagnosis is right. His absolute stance is, well, too absolute. AI-generated prototypes haven’t helped anyone only if you assume they’re all demos, which is exactly what the distinction he just drew tells us not to assume.

(Second link to Chad Johnson this week, but I just discovered his Substack, so ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.)

Chad Johnson, writing in his newsletter, argues that designer influence in product decisions comes from something other than craft output. He lays out the underlying dynamic:

Roadmaps are shaped less by who has the best ideas and more by who controls the framing of tradeoffs. Every roadmap decision is a bet: build this instead of that, now instead of later, for these users instead of those. Whoever makes the risk feel smaller tends to win.

So where does the designer fit? Johnson:

The most influential designers at startups do not position themselves as makers of screens. They act as orientation devices for the team. Orientation is the ability to help a group understand where they are, what matters, and what tradeoffs are real. It precedes prioritization, and it makes decision-making possible.

A designer whose output stops at screens is working on the wrong layer of the problem. Johnson lists the skills that back the orientation role:

Designers who shape direction invest in strategic framing, business literacy, and narrative construction. They learn to say no with evidence and to disagree without drama.

Johnson’s list is right as far as it goes. He understates one skill: legibility. A lot of design influence breaks down at translation. The thinking is strategic; the communication stays in design vocabulary. A sharp problem statement understandable only to other designers stays in the design review. Designers who change the conversation make their analysis readable in product and business terms without flattening it. That’s the same move Johnson gestures at when he describes “decision-ready artifacts” as “tools for comparison… designed to provoke judgment, not admiration.”

Johnson’s closer calls the future of design leadership “quieter, more rigorous, and deeply strategic.” That’s right. It’s also a role that depends on being read by the people making the call.

Tommaso Nervegna writes about LinkedIn killing its Associate Product Manager program and replacing it with a new role called the “Full Stack Builder.” The structural bet is interesting, but the finding from their rollout is what matters:

The expectation was that AI would be a great equalizer: juniors would benefit most because AI would close their skill gaps, while seniors would resist the change. The reality was the opposite. Top performers adopted AI fastest and derived the most value from it. Why? Because they had the judgment and experience to know what to ask for, how to evaluate the output, and where to apply it for maximum leverage.

That tracks with everything I’ve predicted, experienced, and seen. The skill that makes AI useful is knowing what good looks like before and after the model generates something. That ability comes from reps.

Nervegna distills LinkedIn CPO Tomer Cohen’s thesis to five skills AI cannot automate:

The five skills that AI cannot automate, according to Cohen, are Vision, Empathy, Communication, Creativity, and Judgment. As he puts it: “I’m working hard to automate everything else.”

The operational version:

The critical insight: the builder orchestrates the agents. The agents execute. Judgment stays human. This is not about replacing people with AI. It’s about compressing the team needed to ship something meaningful from fifteen people to three - or even one.

I’ve been calling this the orchestrator gap: the distance between a designer who uses AI and one who directs it. LinkedIn just gave it a job title. I think we will see more companies go this way. Whether or not it’s a good idea remains to be seen.

The Sonos app disaster taught me something about roadmaps. Leadership kept adding initiatives—Sonos Radio, the Ace headphones—without ever naming what those additions displaced. QA got squeezed. Stability testing got cut. The designers who warned them were overruled. No leader said out loud what was being sacrificed to make room.

Yusuf Aytas names exactly this failure:

People like to talk about priorities as if the main problem is choosing what matters. In practice, the deterministic factor is capacity. Team capacity. System capacity. The share you lose to maintenance, interruptions, coordination, and keeping the machine fit to run. Ignoring these physical limits turns an ambitious roadmap into a collective illusion.

“Collective illusion.” That’s the right name for it. Aytas on where the dishonesty starts:

A new customer request appears. Leadership wants a visible bet. Sales needs something for a deal. Everyone talks about importance. Almost nobody says what gets pushed out. That is the real decision. They have only added pressure and left the team to absorb the contradiction later.

Aytas builds the whole piece around a carpentry metaphor—one saw, limited operators, timber that needs oiling and adjustment before it can be cut. Software hides the constraint better, but the physics are the same. There’s more in the piece on shaping work before it competes for capacity, using visible investment buckets, and why reallocation is never free.

Designers have been saying this for years. Cameras don’t take pictures, photographers do. Tools don’t make you a better designer. Now the PM world is arriving at the same conclusion.

Shreyas Doshi argues that AI tools will commoditize across companies—any effective tool becomes common knowledge—and the only durable career moat is the human judgment applied on top of AI outputs. He calls it “Product Sense.”

Tools have never been a significant source of alpha in product success and that is not changing with AI tools. What this means for you personally is that - while you can and should use all the AI tools you can - you cannot bank on your use of those AI tools today to provide you a long-term advantage in your product career.

Replace “product people” with “designers” and this could be a post on my blog. The five skills Shreyas decomposes Product Sense into—empathy, simulation, strategic thinking, taste, creative execution—are skills good designers have cultivated under different names for decades.

The piece includes an appended Claude conversation that stress-tests the argument. The sharpest exchange challenges the Silicon Valley orthodoxy that fast B+ beats slow A+:

In practice, the B+ decision made quickly tends to create a cascade of follow-on decisions, each of which is also slightly off, and you end up significantly off-course in ways that are expensive to correct. Whereas the A+ decision, even if it takes longer, tends to set you on a trajectory where subsequent decisions are easier and more obvious. The compounding effect favors quality of judgment, not speed of judgment.

Good judgment compounds. Bad judgment compounds too, just in the wrong direction.

Prototypes have always been alignment tools. Whether you’re testing with users or convincing leadership, the prototype’s job is to make the abstract concrete. That part isn’t new.

What’s worth noticing in Emma Webster’s case study roundup on the Figma blog is who’s doing the prototyping. Three stories. Three product managers. Zero designer protagonists.

ServiceNow’s Ram Devanathan explains the dynamic:

“They have a big portfolio, so they can’t always pivot directly to my project.”

So Ram built it himself in Make. His designer’s mockup missed the nuance he was after, so he took a crack at it:

“Make helped me show what I meant rather than trying to describe it in the abstract. I’m able to explain my ideas better. I’m able to convince people faster. That reduces the whole cycle for me.”

Ticketmaster PM Brian Muehlenkamp prototyped an AI assistant that wasn’t even on the roadmap and shipped it. Affirm’s SVP of Product Vishal Kapoor puts the value in craft terms:

“The real work lives in the variations, rabbit holes, and edge cases. It requires a lot of thinking, a lot of precision, and a lot of love.”

All three stories follow the same arc: PM has an idea, designer is unavailable or the mockup misses the mark, PM builds it in Make, team aligns faster. Designers aren’t the heroes of these stories. They’re the bottleneck the tool routes around.

I don’t think that’s Figma’s intended message. But it’s the one that came through to me.

Darragh Curran’s 2× goal reads like a halftime speech. We can do this. The tools are here. The gap is behavioral. Double your output in twelve months.

Claire Vo wrote the post-game report:

If AI adoption had 7 stages of grief, almost all of you would be in denial. No matter how many AI memos your CEO sends, the amount of Claude that’s being Coded, the chatbots in app and the evals in data—I’m here to tell you: you’re not competing. In fact, you probably can’t anymore.

Vo’s target is the company that thinks it’s adapting: AI features shipped, internal power users, a natural-language interface named after a gem. She’s not buying it:

While they try on the bows and ribbons of an AI-native team, they ignore the fact that their bones are old and the company has calcified. For the most part: sales still sells the same and marketing is still talking about channels and CAC and product says “prioritize” and eng says “capacity” and the board is endlessly asking either about Q1 perf and Q2 projections or the ever-elusive “increase in product velocity.”

“Bows and ribbons” versus “bones.” That’s the whole post in one sentence.

I have some sympathy for the incumbents, though. Vo’s startup-swagger framing undersells how much gravitational pull a $100M business carries. Enterprise contracts, compliance obligations, a customer base that didn’t sign up for a pivot. The companies she’s diagnosing aren’t stupid. They’re heavy. And heavy things don’t accelerate the same way light things do, even when both see the cliff.

None of that makes her wrong. It just means even the companies that want to change are fighting physics. But they’ll have to figure it out sooner than later.

I’ve seen this at every company past a certain size: you spot a disjointed UX problem across the product, you know what needs to happen, and then you spend three months in alignment meetings trying to get six teams to agree on a button style.

A recent piece from Laura Klein at Nielsen Norman Group examines why most product teams aren’t actually empowered, despite what the org chart claims. Klein on fragmentation:

When you have dozens of empowered teams, each optimizing its own metrics and building its own features, you get a product that feels like it was designed by dozens of different companies. One team’s area uses a modal dialog for confirmations. Another team uses an inline message. A third team navigates to a new page. The buttons say Submit in one place, Save in another, and Continue in a third. The tone of the microcopy varies wildly from formal to casual.

Users don’t see teams. They don’t see component boundaries. They just see a confusing, inconsistent product that seems to have been designed by people who never talked to each other, because, in a sense, it was.

Each team was empowered to make the best decisions for their area, and it did! But nobody was empowered to maintain coherence across the whole experience.

That last line is the whole problem. “Coherence,” as Klein calls it, is a design leadership responsibility, and it gets harder as AI lets individual teams ship faster without coordinating with each other. If every squad can generate production UI in hours instead of weeks, the fragmentation described here accelerates. Design systems become the only thing standing between your product and a Frankenstein experience.

The article is also sharp on what happens to PMs inside this dysfunction:

Picture a PM who spends 70% of her time in meetings coordinating with other teams, getting buy-in for a small change, negotiating priorities, trying to align roadmaps, escalating conflicts, chasing down dependencies, and attending working groups created to solve coordination problems. She spends a tiny fraction of her time with users. The rest is spent writing documents that explain her team’s work to other teams, updating roadmaps, reporting status, and attending planning meetings. She was hired to be a strategic product thinker, but she’s become a project manager, focused entirely on logistics and coordination.

I’ve watched this happen to PMs I’ve worked with. The coordination tax eats the strategic work. Marty Cagan calls this “product management theater”—a surplus of PMs who function as overpaid project managers. If AI compresses the engineering work but the coordination overhead stays the same, that ratio gets even more lopsided.

The fix is smaller teams with real ownership and strong design systems that enforce coherence without requiring 14 alignment meetings. But that requires organizational courage most companies don’t have.

Every article I share on this blog starts the same way: in my RSS reader. I use Inoreader to follow about a hundred feeds—design blogs, tech publications, and independent newsletters. Every morning I scroll through what’s new, mark what’s interesting, and the best stuff eventually becomes a link post here. It’s not a fancy workflow. It’s an RSS reader and a notes app. But it works because the format works.

This is a 2023 article, but I’m fascinated by it because Google Reader was so influential in my life. David Pierce, writing for The Verge, chronicles how Google Reader came to be and why Google killed it.

Chris Wetherell, who built the first prototype, wasn’t thinking about an RSS reader. He was thinking about a universal information layer:

“I drew a big circle on the whiteboard,” he recalls. “And I said, ‘This is information.’ And then I drew spokes off of it, saying, ‘These are videos. This is news. This is this and that.’” He told the iGoogle team that the future of information might be to turn everything into a feed and build a way to aggregate those feeds.

Jason Shellen, the product manager, saw the same thing:

“We were trying to avoid saying ‘feed reader,’” Shellen says, “or reading at all. Because I think we built a social product.”

Google couldn’t see it. Reader had 30 million users, many of them daily, but that was a rounding error by Google standards. Pierce captures the absurdity well:

Almost nothing ever hits Google scale, which is why Google kills almost everything.

So Google poured its resources into Google Plus instead. That product was dead within months of launch. Reader, the thing they killed to make room for it, had been a working social network the whole time. Jenna Bilotta, a designer on the team:

“They could have taken the resources that were allocated for Google Plus, invested them in Reader, and turned Reader into the amazing social network that it was starting to be.”

What gets me is that the vision Wetherell drew on that whiteboard—a single place to follow everything you care about, organized by your taste, shared with people you trust, and non-algorithmic—still doesn’t fully exist. RSS readers are the closest thing we have, and they’re good enough that I’ve built my entire reading and writing practice around one. But the curation layer Wetherell imagined is still unfinished.